[
  {
    "id": "pl-2025-presidential",
    "country": "pl",
    "slug": "2025-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "Poland 2025 Presidential Election",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie w Polsce 2025"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2025-05-18",
      "round2": "2025-06-01"
    },
    "status": "held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "Karol Nawrocki won the run-off on record turnout. The campaign saw documented Russia-linked information operations that authorities countered, and the result’s validation became the subject of an institutional dispute over the validating court chamber.",
      "pl": "Karol Nawrocki wygrał drugą turę przy rekordowej frekwencji. W kampanii udokumentowano powiązane z Rosją operacje informacyjne, którym władze przeciwdziałały, a zatwierdzenie wyniku stało się przedmiotem sporu instytucjonalnego o izbę zatwierdzającą."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "State Electoral Commission (PKW)",
        "pl": "Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza (PKW)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 71.63,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Rafał Trzaskowski",
              "pct": 31.4
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Karol Nawrocki",
              "pct": 29.5
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Sławomir Mentzen",
              "pct": 14.8
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Grzegorz Braun",
              "pct": 6.3
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "round": 2,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Karol Nawrocki",
              "pct": 50.89,
              "votes": 10606877
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Rafał Trzaskowski",
              "pct": 49.11,
              "votes": 10237286
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "pkw-2025",
        "pap-pl-validity-2025"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Under the government’s “Parasol Wyborczy” (Election Umbrella) programme, NASK and partners handled roughly 27,500 potential incidents, reported over 16,000 accounts linked to influence operations to platforms, and identified 176 candidate-impersonation incidents (169 blocked).",
            "pl": "W ramach rządowego programu „Parasol Wyborczy” NASK i partnerzy obsłużyli około 27 500 potencjalnych incydentów, zgłosili platformom ponad 16 000 kont powiązanych z operacjami wpływu i zidentyfikowali 176 przypadków podszywania się pod kandydatów (169 zablokowano)."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "parasol-wyborczy-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "corroborated",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Russia-linked Doppelganger operation targeted the campaign on X, mimicking the branding of legitimate Polish outlets to push anti-EU and anti-Ukraine narratives; researchers attributed it to Russia’s EU-sanctioned Social Design Agency.",
            "pl": "Powiązana z Rosją operacja Doppelganger atakowała kampanię na platformie X, podszywając się pod znane polskie media, by rozpowszechniać narracje antyunijne i antyukraińskie; badacze przypisali ją objętej sankcjami UE rosyjskiej Social Design Agency."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "a4e-doppelganger-poland-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Supreme Court chamber received more than 54,000 election protests and confirmed 21 instances of irregularities, but ruled that they did not affect the result and that a full recount was not permitted under the Electoral Code.",
            "pl": "Izba Sądu Najwyższego otrzymała ponad 54 000 protestów wyborczych i potwierdziła 21 przypadków nieprawidłowości, ale orzekła, że nie wpłynęły one na wynik i że pełne przeliczenie nie jest dopuszczalne w świetle Kodeksu wyborczego."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "pap-pl-validity-2025",
            "nfp-pl-validity-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "NASK reported unlabeled political advertisements on Facebook that may have been financed from abroad, asked Meta to halt them, and referred the matter to the Internal Security Agency (ABW).",
            "pl": "NASK zgłosił nieoznaczone reklamy polityczne na Facebooku, które mogły być finansowane z zagranicy, poprosił Meta o ich wstrzymanie i przekazał sprawę Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW)."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "nask-ads-2025"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the count was falsified or the outcome would change — not established. The only body to adjudicate found the confirmed irregularities immaterial to the result.",
            "pl": "Że liczenie sfałszowano lub że wynik uległby zmianie — nieustalone. Jedyny organ orzekający uznał potwierdzone nieprawidłowości za nieistotne dla rezultatu."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "pap-pl-validity-2025",
            "nfp-pl-validity-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "contested",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The legitimacy of the Supreme Court chamber that validated the election is itself contested — rejected by the current government, European courts and many Supreme Court judges. The dispute concerns the validating body’s status, not evidence that the tally was wrong.",
            "pl": "Kwestionowana jest sama legitymacja izby Sądu Najwyższego, która zatwierdziła wybory — odrzucana przez obecny rząd, sądy europejskie i wielu sędziów Sądu Najwyższego. Spór dotyczy statusu organu zatwierdzającego, a nie dowodów, że wynik był błędny."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "nfp-pl-validity-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the documented information operations measurably changed voter behaviour or the outcome — not established. Observers document the activity and the countermeasures, not a decisive effect on the result.",
            "pl": "Że udokumentowane operacje informacyjne wymiernie zmieniły zachowania wyborców lub wynik — nieustalone. Obserwatorzy dokumentują działalność i przeciwdziałania, nie zaś decydujący wpływ na rezultat."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "odihr-poland-2025",
            "parasol-wyborczy-2025"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "processAssessment": {
      "summary": {
        "en": "ODIHR assessed the election as competitive and efficiently managed with fundamental freedoms respected, while noting that authorities had to deploy countermeasures against disinformation and foreign interference, and flagging media polarization including by the public broadcaster.",
        "pl": "ODIHR ocenił wybory jako konkurencyjne i sprawnie przeprowadzone, z poszanowaniem podstawowych wolności, zaznaczając zarazem, że władze musiały wdrożyć środki przeciwdziałania dezinformacji i zagranicznej ingerencji, oraz wskazując na polaryzację mediów, w tym nadawcy publicznego."
      },
      "sourceRefs": [
        "odihr-poland-2025"
      ]
    },
    "operations": [
      "doppelganger"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      "rigged-before-voting-day"
    ],
    "actors": [
      "social-design-agency"
    ],
    "claims": [],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "odihr-poland-2025",
      "parasol-wyborczy-2025",
      "pap-pl-validity-2025"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "ro-2024-presidential",
    "country": "ro",
    "slug": "2024-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "Romania 2024 Presidential Election (annulled)",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie w Rumunii 2024 (unieważnione)"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2024-11-24"
    },
    "status": "annulled",
    "summary": {
      "en": "The Constitutional Court annulled the first round in December 2024, citing a coordinated online operation and campaign-finance violations, after intelligence was declassified. A 2025 re-run was held and won by Nicușor Dan. Conclusive attribution of the operation to a foreign state was never officially established.",
      "pl": "Trybunał Konstytucyjny unieważnił pierwszą turę w grudniu 2024 r., powołując się na skoordynowaną operację internetową i naruszenia finansowania kampanii, po odtajnieniu materiałów wywiadowczych. W 2025 r. odbyła się powtórka, którą wygrał Nicușor Dan. Jednoznacznej atrybucji operacji do obcego państwa nigdy oficjalnie nie ustalono."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "Constitutional Court / Permanent Electoral Authority",
        "pl": "Trybunał Konstytucyjny / Stały Urząd Wyborczy"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 52.5,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "label": {
            "en": "Annulled first round, 24 Nov 2024",
            "pl": "Unieważniona I tura, 24 listopada 2024"
          },
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Călin Georgescu",
              "pct": 22.9,
              "note": {
                "en": "First-round lead; run-off never held",
                "pl": "Prowadzenie po I turze; II tury nie przeprowadzono"
              }
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Elena Lasconi",
              "pct": 19.2
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Marcel Ciolacu",
              "pct": 19.2
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "ccr-romania-32-2024",
        "odihr-romania-2025"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Constitutional Court, acting ex officio, annulled the entire first round on 6 December 2024 and ordered the process restarted, after intelligence was declassified on 4 December."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "venice-romania-2025",
            "odihr-romania-2025",
            "ccr-romania-32-2024"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "A coordinated inauthentic operation on TikTok artificially amplified the leading candidate; TikTok removed 27,217 inauthentic accounts and France’s VIGINUM documented the astroturfing and covert influencer recruitment."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "viginum-romania-2025",
            "odihr-romania-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The European Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok under the Digital Services Act over the mitigation of election-integrity risks in the Romanian vote."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ec-tiktok-dsa-2024"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "contested",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That Russia or any specific foreign state directed or funded the operation — not established. VIGINUM concluded the sponsor remained unknown, and the annulment ruling itself did not explicitly attribute the operation to a foreign state."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "viginum-romania-2025",
            "venice-romania-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "No ballot falsification or miscount was alleged or found. A recount confirmed the first-round tally; the annulment rested on campaign conduct and finance, not on altered vote totals."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "venice-romania-2025",
            "odihr-romania-2025"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "contested",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Whether the ex officio annulment met European legal standards is contested; the Venice Commission set standards for such annulments while expressly declining to rule on the decision itself."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "venice-romania-2025"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "operations": [],
    "narratives": [],
    "actors": [],
    "claims": [],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "venice-romania-2025",
      "viginum-romania-2025",
      "odihr-romania-2025",
      "ccr-romania-32-2024"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "md-2024-presidential",
    "country": "md",
    "slug": "2024-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "Moldova 2024 Presidential Election & EU Referendum",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie i referendum UE w Mołdawii 2024"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2024-10-20",
      "round2": "2024-11-03"
    },
    "status": "held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "Observers assessed the vote as well managed and it returned pro-EU incumbent Maia Sandu, even as a documented Russia-linked vote-buying and disinformation campaign — attributed to the Shor network — operated around it. Interference in the environment is separate from the integrity of the count.",
      "pl": "Obserwatorzy ocenili głosowanie jako dobrze zorganizowane i przyniosło ono reelekcję proeuropejskiej Mai Sandu, mimo udokumentowanej, powiązanej z Rosją kampanii kupowania głosów i dezinformacji — przypisywanej sieci Szora. Ingerencja w otoczenie to co innego niż integralność liczenia."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "Central Electoral Commission (CEC)",
        "pl": "Centralna Komisja Wyborcza (CEC)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 54.3,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Maia Sandu",
              "pct": 42.49
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Alexandr Stoianoglo",
              "pct": 25.95
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "round": 2,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Maia Sandu",
              "pct": 55.35
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Alexandr Stoianoglo",
              "pct": 44.65
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "cec-moldova-2024",
        "odihr-moldova-2024"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "A Russia-origin vote-buying operation run through the Shor network moved money to voters via the sanctioned Russian bank Promsvyazbank; it was documented by Moldovan police, DFRLab and Meta and matched by a U.S. sanctions designation."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "dfrlab-moldova-2024",
            "state-moldova-2024",
            "moscowtimes-moldova-2024"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "corroborated",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Coordinated disinformation accompanied the vote: Meta removed a network of fake Russian-language news brands, and forged letters impersonating EU and Moldovan bodies circulated."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "dfrlab-moldova-2024",
            "odihr-moldova-2024"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the count or certified results were falsified — not established. ODIHR assessed the administration as professional and impartial and the EU endorsed the results."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "odihr-moldova-2024",
            "eeas-moldova-2024"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Direct Kremlin command-and-control of the operations is not conclusively established; DFRLab characterised the activity as pro-Russian, and the U.S. framed intelligence coordination as likely rather than proven."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "dfrlab-moldova-2024",
            "state-moldova-2024"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That vote-buying determined the outcome — not established. No authoritative finding quantifies how many votes were actually cast as a result of payments."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "odihr-moldova-2024"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "processAssessment": {
      "summary": {
        "en": "ODIHR concluded both presidential rounds and the referendum were well managed and that contestants campaigned freely despite illicit foreign interference and active disinformation efforts, and assessed the election administration as professional and impartial.",
        "pl": "ODIHR uznał obie tury wyborów prezydenckich oraz referendum za dobrze przeprowadzone i stwierdził, że kandydaci prowadzili kampanię swobodnie mimo bezprawnej zagranicznej ingerencji i aktywnej dezinformacji, a administrację wyborczą ocenił jako profesjonalną i bezstronną."
      },
      "sourceRefs": [
        "odihr-moldova-2024"
      ]
    },
    "operations": [],
    "narratives": [],
    "actors": [],
    "claims": [],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "odihr-moldova-2024",
      "eeas-moldova-2024",
      "dfrlab-moldova-2024"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "us-2020-presidential",
    "country": "us",
    "slug": "2020-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "United States 2020 Presidential Election",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie w USA 2020"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2020-11-03"
    },
    "status": "held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "Federal security officials, courts, the Justice Department and full hand recounts found no evidence that fraud or machine manipulation altered the outcome. Claims of a “stolen” election are recorded here as debunked.",
      "pl": "Federalni urzędnicy ds. bezpieczeństwa, sądy, Departament Sprawiedliwości i pełne ręczne przeliczenia nie znalazły dowodów, że oszustwo lub manipulacja maszynami zmieniły wynik. Twierdzenia o „skradzionych” wyborach są tu odnotowane jako obalone."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "U.S. Electoral College (certified by Congress)",
        "pl": "Kolegium Elektorów USA (potwierdzone przez Kongres)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 66.6,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Joseph R. Biden (D)",
              "pct": 51.3,
              "votes": 81283501,
              "note": {
                "en": "306 electoral votes",
                "pl": "306 głosów elektorskich"
              }
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Donald Trump (R)",
              "pct": 46.9,
              "votes": 74223975,
              "note": {
                "en": "232 electoral votes",
                "pl": "232 głosy elektorskie"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "fec-2020-results"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The federal election-security community stated there was no evidence that any voting system deleted, lost or changed votes, and called the election the most secure in American history."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "cisa-most-secure-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Full manual hand recounts in Georgia (statewide) and Antrim County, Michigan reaffirmed the machine tallies to within normal hand-count error."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ga-hand-audit-2020",
            "mi-antrim-audit-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Roughly 60 post-election lawsuits alleging a falsified result failed; the Supreme Court denied Texas’s bid to challenge four other states’ results for lack of standing."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "scotus-texas-penn-2020",
            "cisa-most-secure-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The declassified intelligence assessment found no indications that any foreign actor altered any technical aspect of the voting process, while Russia and Iran ran influence (messaging) operations."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "odni-ica-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The false narrative that Dominion machines switched votes was amplified on cable news and produced the largest known U.S. defamation settlement ($787.5m from Fox) and court findings of falsity."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "fox-dominion-settlement-2023",
            "delaware-dominion-opinion-2025"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the outcome was “stolen” — refuted by dozens of courts, the Justice Department, and recounts and audits."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "barr-no-fraud-2020",
            "cisa-most-secure-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That Dominion or Smartmatic machines flipped or deleted votes — ruled false in court and refuted by hand recounts of paper ballots."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "delaware-dominion-opinion-2025",
            "ga-hand-audit-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "statistical-anomalies",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Alleged statistically impossible vote spikes did not survive audit; hand counts matched or slightly widened the certified margin."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ga-hand-audit-2020",
            "mi-antrim-audit-2020"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "statisticalNotes": [
      {
        "summary": {
          "en": "Security researchers later identified genuine vulnerabilities in the Dominion ImageCast X device (CISA advisory ICSA-22-154-01, 2022).",
          "pl": "Badacze bezpieczeństwa zidentyfikowali później rzeczywiste podatności w urządzeniu Dominion ImageCast X (ostrzeżenie CISA ICSA-22-154-01, 2022)."
        },
        "limitations": {
          "en": "CISA stated it had no evidence these vulnerabilities were exploited in any election, and exploitation would require physical access. The existence of a theoretical vulnerability is not evidence that any vote was changed.",
          "pl": "CISA stwierdziła, że nie ma dowodów wykorzystania tych podatności w jakichkolwiek wyborach, a ich wykorzystanie wymagałoby fizycznego dostępu. Istnienie teoretycznej podatności nie jest dowodem, że jakikolwiek głos zmieniono."
        },
        "sourceRefs": [
          "cisa-icsa-dominion-2022"
        ]
      }
    ],
    "operations": [],
    "narratives": [
      "machines-flipped-votes"
    ],
    "actors": [],
    "claims": [
      "dominion-switched-votes-2020",
      "2000-mules-ballot-trafficking"
    ],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "cisa-most-secure-2020",
      "odni-ica-2020",
      "barr-no-fraud-2020"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "by-2020-presidential",
    "country": "by",
    "slug": "2020-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "Belarus 2020 Presidential Election",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie na Białorusi 2020"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2020-08-09"
    },
    "status": "held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "The official result of 80.1% for Alyaksandr Lukashenko was found by an OSCE Moscow Mechanism rapporteur, the EU and others to be neither free nor fair, amid documented falsification and a mass post-election crackdown. This is a case of confirmed falsification.",
      "pl": "Oficjalny wynik 80,1% dla Alaksandra Łukaszenki został uznany przez sprawozdawcę Mechanizmu Moskiewskiego OBWE, UE i innych za niewolny i nieuczciwy, przy udokumentowanym fałszerstwie i masowych represjach po wyborach. To przypadek potwierdzonego fałszerstwa."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "Central Election Commission (CEC)",
        "pl": "Centralna Komisja Wyborcza (CKW)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 84.28,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Alyaksandr Lukashenko",
              "pct": 80.1,
              "note": {
                "en": "Official announced figure; widely assessed as not credible",
                "pl": "Oficjalnie ogłoszona liczba; powszechnie oceniana jako niewiarygodna"
              }
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya",
              "pct": 10.12
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "belta-belarus-result-2020",
        "osce-moscow-belarus-2020"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The OSCE Moscow Mechanism rapporteur found the allegations that the election was not transparent, free or fair confirmed, referred to “the falsified presidential elections,” and recommended cancelling the results."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "osce-moscow-belarus-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Leading opposition contenders were barred or jailed before the vote, and ODIHR could not observe the election because Belarus failed to issue a timely invitation."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "osce-moscow-belarus-2020",
            "ep-belarus-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "A mass post-election crackdown followed; the UN found at least 37,000 people detained and documented torture and ill-treatment it assessed as widespread and systematic."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ohchr-belarus-2022"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The European Parliament rejected the official results as conducted in flagrant violation of internationally recognised standards and refused to recognise Lukashenko as president after his term expired."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ep-belarus-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "statistical-anomalies",
          "confidence": "corroborated",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Independent parallel-count initiatives comparing photographed ballots against official data concluded the announced result had been falsified, sampling a portion of polling stations."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "osce-moscow-belarus-2020"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The “true” outcome is not independently verified — authorities never published station-level protocols, and the parallel counts covered only part of the stations."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "osce-moscow-belarus-2020"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "No authoritative investigation established that a foreign state altered vote tallies; the documented falsification was attributed to Belarusian state bodies, with Russia’s established role being post-election political and security backing."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "osce-moscow-belarus-2020"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "operations": [],
    "narratives": [],
    "actors": [],
    "claims": [],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "osce-moscow-belarus-2020",
      "ohchr-belarus-2022",
      "ep-belarus-2020"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "us-2016-presidential",
    "country": "us",
    "slug": "2016-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "United States 2016 Presidential Election",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie w USA 2016"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2016-11-08"
    },
    "status": "held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "A Russian influence campaign, social-media operations and hack-and-leak were documented by U.S. official investigations. That vote-counting systems altered the recorded result was not established.",
      "pl": "Amerykańskie oficjalne postępowania udokumentowały rosyjską kampanię wpływu, operacje w mediach społecznościowych oraz wykradanie i publikowanie materiałów. Nie ustalono, by systemy liczenia głosów zmieniły zapisany wynik."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "U.S. Electoral College (certified by Congress)",
        "pl": "Kolegium Elektorów USA (potwierdzone przez Kongres)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 60.1,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Hillary Clinton (D)",
              "pct": 48.2,
              "votes": 65853514,
              "note": {
                "en": "Popular-vote plurality; 227 electoral votes",
                "pl": "Większość w głosowaniu powszechnym; 227 głosów elektorskich"
              }
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Donald Trump (R)",
              "pct": 46.1,
              "votes": 62984828,
              "note": {
                "en": "Won the Electoral College, 304 votes",
                "pl": "Wygrał w Kolegium Elektorów, 304 głosy"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "fec-2016-results"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Russian government interfered in the election in what the Mueller Report called a “sweeping and systematic fashion”; the Intelligence Community assessed that President Putin ordered an influence campaign that developed a preference for candidate Trump.",
            "pl": "Rosyjski rząd ingerował w wybory w sposób, który raport Muellera określił jako „szeroki i systematyczny”; wspólnota wywiadowcza oceniła, że prezydent Putin zlecił kampanię wpływu, w której rozwinęła się preferencja dla kandydata Trumpa."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ica-2017",
            "mueller-report"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Internet Research Agency ran a social-media operation impersonating Americans and buying political ads; 13 Russian nationals and three entities were indicted in February 2018.",
            "pl": "Internet Research Agency prowadziła operację w mediach społecznościowych, podszywając się pod Amerykanów i kupując reklamy polityczne; w lutym 2018 r. postawiono zarzuty 13 obywatelom Rosji i trzem podmiotom."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ira-indictment-2018",
            "ssci-vol2",
            "ica-2017"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "GRU military-intelligence officers (Units 26165 and 74455) hacked the DNC, DCCC and Clinton-campaign accounts and staged the release of stolen material via “Guccifer 2.0” and DCLeaks.",
            "pl": "Oficerowie wywiadu wojskowego GRU (jednostki 26165 i 74455) włamali się do sieci DNC, DCCC i kont kampanii Clinton oraz zorganizowali publikację skradzionych materiałów przez „Guccifer 2.0” i DCLeaks."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "gru-indictment-2018",
            "mueller-report"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Russian actors probed and targeted U.S. election infrastructure at the state and local level from at least 2014.",
            "pl": "Rosyjskie podmioty sondowały i atakowały amerykańską infrastrukturę wyborczą na poziomie stanowym i lokalnym co najmniej od 2014 roku."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ssci-vol1",
            "gru-indictment-2018",
            "ica-2017"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That vote tallies were altered or voting machines manipulated — not established. DHS assessed the systems Russian actors targeted were not involved in vote tallying, and the Senate Committee saw no evidence votes were changed.",
            "pl": "Że liczby głosów zmieniono lub zmanipulowano maszyny — nieustalone. DHS oceniło, że systemy atakowane przez Rosjan nie brały udziału w liczeniu głosów, a komisja Senatu nie znalazła dowodów zmiany głosów."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ica-2017",
            "ssci-vol1"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "information-operations",
          "confidence": "alleged",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the interference changed the outcome — not established. The Intelligence Community explicitly made no assessment of the campaign’s impact on the result.",
            "pl": "Że ingerencja zmieniła wynik — nieustalone. Wspólnota wywiadowcza wyraźnie nie oceniała wpływu kampanii na rezultat."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "ica-2017"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "contested",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Special Counsel’s investigation did not establish that the Trump campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government — an official finding of insufficient evidence, not an exoneration.",
            "pl": "Śledztwo prokuratora specjalnego nie ustaliło, że kampania Trumpa spiskowała lub koordynowała działania z rosyjskim rządem — to oficjalne ustalenie o niewystarczających dowodach, nie uniewinnienie."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "mueller-report"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "operations": [
      "ira-2016-campaign"
    ],
    "narratives": [
      "rigged-before-voting-day"
    ],
    "actors": [
      "internet-research-agency",
      "apt28-gru-26165"
    ],
    "claims": [
      "russia-changed-2016-tallies"
    ],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "ica-2017",
      "mueller-report",
      "ssci-vol1",
      "ssci-vol2"
    ]
  },
  {
    "id": "at-2016-presidential",
    "country": "at",
    "slug": "2016-presidential",
    "type": "presidential",
    "title": {
      "en": "Austria 2016 Presidential Election",
      "pl": "Wybory prezydenckie w Austrii 2016"
    },
    "dates": {
      "round1": "2016-05-22",
      "round2": "2016-12-04"
    },
    "status": "rerun-held",
    "summary": {
      "en": "The Constitutional Court annulled the run-off over unlawful handling of postal ballots — expressly finding no fraud and no proof the outcome was altered. The re-run returned the same winner. This is the clearest case of a process violation that is not falsification.",
      "pl": "Trybunał Konstytucyjny unieważnił drugą turę z powodu bezprawnego postępowania z głosami korespondencyjnymi — wyraźnie nie stwierdzając oszustwa ani dowodu na zmianę wyniku. Powtórka przyniosła tego samego zwycięzcę. To najczytelniejszy przypadek naruszenia procesu, które nie jest fałszerstwem."
    },
    "officialResults": {
      "body": {
        "en": "Federal Electoral Authority (Bundeswahlbehörde)",
        "pl": "Federalny Urząd Wyborczy (Bundeswahlbehörde)"
      },
      "turnoutPct": 74.21,
      "rounds": [
        {
          "round": 1,
          "label": {
            "en": "Annulled run-off, 22 May 2016",
            "pl": "Unieważniona II tura, 22 maja 2016"
          },
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Alexander Van der Bellen",
              "pct": 50.35,
              "votes": 2251517
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Norbert Hofer",
              "pct": 49.65,
              "votes": 2220654
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "round": 2,
          "label": {
            "en": "Valid re-run, 4 December 2016",
            "pl": "Ważna powtórka, 4 grudnia 2016"
          },
          "results": [
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Alexander Van der Bellen",
              "pct": 53.79
            },
            {
              "candidateOrParty": "Norbert Hofer",
              "pct": 46.21
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "sourceRefs": [
        "vfgh-annulment-2016",
        "odihr-austria-2016"
      ]
    },
    "ledger": {
      "established": [
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Constitutional Court annulled the 22 May run-off because postal ballots had been evaluated unlawfully in 14 districts and the electoral authority had released partial results to media before polls closed.",
            "pl": "Trybunał Konstytucyjny unieważnił II turę z 22 maja, ponieważ w 14 okręgach głosy korespondencyjne oceniono bezprawnie, a urząd wyborczy przekazał mediom cząstkowe wyniki przed zamknięciem lokali."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The infringements concerned more than 77,769 postal votes, exceeding the 30,863-vote margin. Under settled case law an election is annulled once an anti-manipulation safeguard is breached in a way that could have influenced the result — no proof of actual manipulation is required.",
            "pl": "Naruszenia dotyczyły ponad 77 769 głosów korespondencyjnych, przekraczając przewagę 30 863 głosów. Zgodnie z utrwalonym orzecznictwem wybory unieważnia się, gdy zabezpieczenie przed manipulacją zostaje naruszone w sposób mogący wpłynąć na wynik — dowód rzeczywistej manipulacji nie jest wymagany."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "statistical-anomalies",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "The Court recorded that no witness perceived any signs of manipulation and that postal-vote results did not statistically diverge from other districts, implying large-scale manipulation was unlikely.",
            "pl": "Trybunał odnotował, że żaden świadek nie dostrzegł oznak manipulacji, a wyniki głosowania korespondencyjnego nie odbiegały statystycznie od innych okręgów, co sugeruje, że manipulacja na dużą skalę była mało prawdopodobna."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "process-violations",
          "confidence": "confirmed",
          "summary": {
            "en": "OSCE/ODIHR assessed the 4 December repeat run-off as professionally and efficiently administered, providing a sound basis for democratic elections.",
            "pl": "OSCE/ODIHR ocenił powtórzoną II turę z 4 grudnia jako przeprowadzoną profesjonalnie i sprawnie, dającą solidną podstawę demokratycznych wyborów."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "odihr-austria-2016"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "notEstablished": [
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the election was “rigged” or falsified — not established. The Court found no fraud or manipulation, the challenge itself alleged none, and the re-run returned the same winner.",
            "pl": "Że wybory „ustawiono” lub sfałszowano — nieustalone. Trybunał nie stwierdził oszustwa ani manipulacji, sam wniosek ich nie zarzucał, a powtórka przyniosła tego samego zwycięzcę."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "result-falsification",
          "confidence": "debunked",
          "summary": {
            "en": "That the irregularities actually changed who won — not established. Annulment followed from the mere possibility that the violations could have influenced the result, not from a finding that they did.",
            "pl": "Że nieprawidłowości faktycznie zmieniły zwycięzcę — nieustalone. Unieważnienie wynikało z samej możliwości, że naruszenia mogły wpłynąć na wynik, a nie z ustalenia, że wpłynęły."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016"
          ]
        },
        {
          "category": "foreign-interference",
          "confidence": "contested",
          "summary": {
            "en": "Foreign interference in this election — not documented by the court ruling or the OSCE/ODIHR assessment.",
            "pl": "Zagraniczna ingerencja w tych wyborach — nieudokumentowana ani w wyroku, ani w ocenie OSCE/ODIHR."
          },
          "sourceRefs": [
            "vfgh-annulment-2016",
            "odihr-austria-2016"
          ]
        }
      ]
    },
    "operations": [],
    "narratives": [],
    "actors": [],
    "claims": [],
    "sourceRefs": [
      "vfgh-annulment-2016",
      "odihr-austria-2016"
    ]
  }
]