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“Foreign interference decided who won the election”

The most portable election narrative there is: a documented influence operation is treated as proof that it changed the result. The step it skips is the one that matters — reach is not persuasion, and persuasion is not a changed count. Every case in this database where interference was documented and the outcome was then examined found the same thing: the operation was real and the outcome held. Canada’s public inquiry said the Liberals would have formed government in 2019 and 2021 regardless; Macron won by 32 points on hand-counted paper after MacronLeaks; Google found almost no organic engagement with DragonBridge’s Taiwan campaign. The narrative is also useful to the interfering state, which gains more from being believed to be decisive than from being decisive.

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Įrodymų biblioteka

Oficiali ataskaitaPublic Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions2025 m. sausio 28 d.
Kanados užsienio kišimosi komisijos galutinė ataskaita, 1 tomas
OriginalasArchyvuota
TyrimasAtlantic Council2021 m. birželis
#MacronLeaks operacija: post mortem
OriginalasArchyvuota
Platformos ataskaitaGoogle Threat Analysis Group2024 m. birželio 26 d.
Google sutrikdė daugiau nei 10 000 DRAGONBRIDGE veiklos atvejų 2024 m. I ketv.
OriginalasArchyvuota
TyrimasAtlantic Council2021 m. birželis
#MacronLeaks operacija: post mortem
OriginalasArchyvuota
Published 2026 m. rugsėjo 22 d.
2026 m. rugsėjo 22 d.Published1579e19e
Every change to this record is a commit in the project’s version history. The reference beside each date identifies it.

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