انتخابات 2026 ریکسداگ سوئد

چه چیزهایی را باید زیر نظر داشت

These were the open questions before the vote. Each is answered below against the evidence — including where the answer is that it did not happen.

• عملیات اطلاعاتی

  این‌که آیا فعالیت غیرصادقانه هماهنگ‌شده، کارزار را به زبان سوئدی هدف قرار می‌دهد، و آیا از طریق دیاسپورا یا کانال‌های زبان اقلیت، به‌جای فضای اصلیِ سوئدی‌زبان، عمل می‌کند.

  منبع را ببینید
  Partly

  Coordinated inauthentic activity in Swedish was documented, but not as targeting the campaign, and it ran in the mainstream Swedish-language space on X rather than through diaspora or minority-language channels. The Psychological Defence Agency published on 1 September 2026 a report on a partly AI-driven network of about 1,200 accounts, some 60 of them posing as Swedish users, that had polarised Swedish political debate in 2025 and 2026 until X suspended every account in summer 2026, before polling day. The day after the vote the agency found no coordinated foreign information influence directed at the election. None of the sources reviewed for this record documents activity through diaspora or minority-language channels.

  منبع را ببینید
• مداخله خارجی

  این‌که آیا فعالیت خصمانه متوجه محیط کارزار پس از الحاق به NATO است، و آیا توسط مقامات سوئدی به‌موقع مستند می‌شود تا پیش از روز رأی‌گیری قابل ارزیابی باشد.

  Partly

  Swedish authorities did publish their assessments before polling day, and those assessments found no hostile activity directed at the election itself. Nine days before the vote the Psychological Defence Agency stated that no coordinated foreign information campaigns aimed at the election were under way and that it was not a priority target; the day after, the agency and the National Cyber Security Centre reported no coordinated foreign information influence directed at the election and no cyber event affecting its conduct. The one state-linked operation documented in the period, the Holiday bot network, was made public on 1 September after being taken down in the summer; the agency says it has evidence that a state actor ordered it but has made no definitive attribution, names no state, and did not link it to the election.

  منبع را ببینید
• نقض‌های فرایندی

  این‌که سامانه نمایش برگه رأیِ باز، که مدت‌ها به‌سبب آشکار کردن انتخاب رأی‌دهنده هنگام انتخاب برگه‌ها در محل رأی‌گیری مورد انتقاد بوده است، در برابر استانداردهای محرمانگی رأی چگونه عمل می‌کند.

  Not established

  No observer assessed how the arrangement performed on 13 September, because ODIHR deployed no observation activity. The arrangement has also changed since the criticism the question refers to: ballot papers have had to be displayed behind a screen since the 2019 European Parliament elections, and the Election Authority's rules for 2026 require voters to take their ballots alone and unseen, with only polling staff allowed to lay them out. ODIHR's 2026 needs assessment described the screens as contributing to secrecy but lengthening voting and causing queues, and recorded that a parliamentary inquiry was weighing a single ballot listing all parties or a neutral ballot. Appeals citing long queues at some polling stations were pending before the Election Review Board as of 24 September 2026.

  منبع را ببینید
• عملیات اطلاعاتی

  سابقه مستندِ هدف‌گیری کشور، نه شواهدی از فعالیت در کارزار 2026 سوئد: Portal Kombat زیرساخت‌های هدف‌گیرنده سوئد را در شبکه 224-پورتالی خود حفظ کرده بود. مراقب بازنشر خودکار، دامنه‌های محلی‌سازی‌شده و دستکاری جست‌وجو باشید.

  منبع را ببینید
  Not established

  No source reviewed for this record documents Portal Kombat activity aimed at the 2026 campaign, such as automated republication, localised domains or search manipulation, and none rules it out. The Psychological Defence Agency's post-election assessment found no extensive coordinated activity from the actors it follows in connection with the election, but it did not address the network by name.

  منبع را ببینید