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“The election results system was hacked, so the declared count is false”

An attack on a results-reporting system is repeatedly presented as an attack on the count. In every documented case here the two were separate systems. Ukraine’s Central Election Commission was genuinely compromised in 2014 and a fake results page was prepared — but ballots are paper, counted by hand at the precinct and carried physically for aggregation, and CERT-UA assessed the attack could in no way have determined the outcome. The Philippine "single IP address" claim was examined and rejected by both accredited citizens’ arms. Reports of Chinese nationals arrested for hacking Korean systems were called entirely false by the US military named in them. Public display layers are soft targets precisely because they are public; the legal count usually is not connected to them at all.

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Įrodymų biblioteka

Stebėtojų ataskaitaOSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)June 30, 2014
Ukraina, ankstyvieji prezidento rinkimai, 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. — ODIHR galutinė ataskaita
OriginalasArchyvuota
Stebėtojų ataskaitaNational Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)September 7, 2023Naujas
Oficialus NAMFREL pareiškimas dėl klausimų, iškeltų dėl 2022 m. nacionalinių ir vietos rinkimų rezultatų
OriginalasArchyvuota
Stebėtojų ataskaitaOSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)June 30, 2014
Ukraina, ankstyvieji prezidento rinkimai, 2014 m. gegužės 25 d. — ODIHR galutinė ataskaita
OriginalasArchyvuota
Published September 22, 2026
September 22, 2026Published1579e19e
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