Poland 2025 Presidential Election
May 18, 2025 – June 1, 2025
Karol Nawrocki won the run-off on record turnout. The campaign saw documented Russia-linked information operations that authorities countered, and the result’s validation became the subject of an institutional dispute over the validating court chamber.
Official results
The Integrity Ledger
What the evidence establishes, and what it does not — side by side, each finding sourced and tiered.
What is established
- Information operationsConfirmed
Under the government’s “Parasol Wyborczy” (Election Umbrella) programme, NASK and partners handled roughly 27,500 potential incidents, reported over 16,000 accounts linked to influence operations to platforms, and identified 176 candidate-impersonation incidents (169 blocked).
Sources:1 - Information operationsCorroborated
The Russia-linked Doppelganger operation targeted the campaign on X, mimicking the branding of legitimate Polish outlets to push anti-EU and anti-Ukraine narratives; researchers attributed it to Russia’s EU-sanctioned Social Design Agency.
Sources:1 - Process violationsConfirmed
The Supreme Court chamber received more than 54,000 election protests and confirmed 21 instances of irregularities, but ruled that they did not affect the result and that a full recount was not permitted under the Electoral Code.
- Foreign interferenceAlleged
NASK reported unlabeled political advertisements on Facebook that may have been financed from abroad, asked Meta to halt them, and referred the matter to the Internal Security Agency (ABW).
Sources:1
What is not established
- Result falsificationDebunked
That the count was falsified or the outcome would change — not established. The only body to adjudicate found the confirmed irregularities immaterial to the result.
- Process violationsContested
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court chamber that validated the election is itself contested — rejected by the current government, European courts and many Supreme Court judges. The dispute concerns the validating body’s status, not evidence that the tally was wrong.
Sources:1 - Foreign interferenceAlleged
That the documented information operations measurably changed voter behaviour or the outcome — not established. Observers document the activity and the countermeasures, not a decisive effect on the result.
Process assessment
ODIHR assessed the election as competitive and efficiently managed with fundamental freedoms respected, while noting that authorities had to deploy countermeasures against disinformation and foreign interference, and flagging media polarization including by the public broadcaster.