The truth about elections, held to a single standard.

Elections documented, attacked, and defended — with proven falsification kept strictly apart from interference, propaganda, and mere anomaly. Every finding is tiered by the strength of its evidence.

Explore elections How we verify

62: elections
20: operations
395: sources

Database last updated September 6, 2026

Election spotlight

2024

SenegalPresidentialHeld

Senegal 2024 Presidential Election

Bassirou Diomaye Faye won the presidency in the first round with 54.28 per cent of valid votes against Amadou Ba's 35.79 per cent, on 61.30 per cent turnout, ten days after being released from pre-trial detention under an amnesty law. The vote was held on 24 March rather than the scheduled 25 February because the President had revoked the convocation of the electorate by decree and the National Assembly had voted to move the poll to 15 December 2024; on 15 February the Constitutional Council held that law contrary to Articles 27 and 103 of the Constitution and annulled the decree, and when no new date followed it fixed one itself and convened the electorate. The record of what happened around that reversal is documented here too: two nationwide mobile internet suspensions, a broadcaster's licence withdrawn and restored outside any legal procedure, a campaign cut from the 21 days the Electoral Code requires to 14, the wholesale replacement of the electoral supervision commission in November 2023, and results that have still not been published polling station by polling station.

Process violations

8 established · 5 not established

See what the evidence shows

Next up

See the full calendar

Research tools

Interrogate the evidence, not just the headlines

Ask precise questions, compare cases, trace documented relationships, inspect change over time, and reuse the underlying data.

Evidence Lab

Build a transparent question and inspect every matching case.

Investigations

Short, curated paths through cases and primary evidence.

Compare

Compare the evidence fingerprints of three elections.

Network

Walk from a case to its findings, sources and related records.

Country Twins

Find countries with comparable voting rules and safeguards.

Time Machine

See when records entered the public database and changed.

Timeline

Documented cases in chronological order.

Statistics

The corpus counted, compared and charted.

Open Data

Bulk exports and a read-only API, CC BY 4.0.

Five categories, never conflated

The difference between these is the whole point. An attacked election is not the same as a falsified one.

Result falsification

The recorded numbers do not reflect the votes cast.

Process violations

Unequal media access, repression, illegal financing, vote buying, misuse of state resources.

Foreign interference

Cyberattacks, hack-and-leak, covert foreign financing, impersonation of media or institutions by a foreign state or proxy.

Information operations

Troll farms, fake local-media networks, covert political ads, coordinated inauthentic amplification — foreign or domestic.

Statistical anomalies

Patterns in the data worth examining — explicitly not proof of fraud.

A finding sits in exactly one category. Colors and icons carry the same meaning everywhere on the site.

From the case files

What was proven — and what was not

The clearest test of a trustworthy record is whether it can hold both statements at once.

Ecuador 2025 Presidential Election

What is established

Process violationsCorroborated
Incumbency and government communication created an uneven campaign environment.
More detail
The EU mission identified advantages linked to the sitting president's office, including campaign-period presidential activity and government advertising. Its priority recommendations called for limiting government and presidential activity to current affairs or emergencies and strengthening controls on institutional communication. These imbalances matter even though observers found election-day voting and counting transparent.
Sources:1
Information operationsCorroborated
Fraud narratives circulated before and after the runoff without objective support in the records observers reviewed.
More detail
The losing ticket alleged fraud on election night, and fraud narratives circulated through the campaign. EU and OAS observers tested the allegations against direct observation, publication systems and tally-sheet images and did not find supporting evidence.
Sources:1 2

What is not established

Result falsificationDebunked
Observer review found no evidence that questioned tally sheets were changed in the computerized result.
More detail
The OAS mission randomly selected questioned tally-sheet images and compared them with the CNE results system without finding irregularities or inconsistencies. The EU mission likewise found no objective elements supporting fraud accusations after observing both rounds and the post-election period.
Sources:1 2
Statistical anomaliesDebunked
A small number of ink-transfer cases did not amount to systematic ballot invalidation.
More detail
The OAS observed isolated cases where ink marked a folded ballot, but nearly all were resolved at the polling board in front of both tickets' representatives. It found very few affected ballots, no systematic intent and no scale capable of affecting the result.
Sources:1