Assessed the 4 December 2016 repeat run-off as professionally and efficiently administered, providing a sound basis for democratic elections, with recommendations to strengthen postal voting.
Publication history
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July 23, 2026
353 / 495 records published
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What changed afterward
251 records were added or revised after July 23, 2026.
NASK reported detecting unlabeled political advertisements on Facebook that may have been financed from abroad, asked Meta to halt them, and referred the matter to Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW).
The declassified Intelligence Community Assessment judged that President Putin ordered an influence campaign targeting the 2016 election, and recorded DHS’s assessment that the systems Russian actors targeted were not involved in vote tallying; the IC made no assessment of the campaign’s impact on the outcome.
The court granted Dominion summary judgment that vote-manipulation statements were false, recounting the earlier Fox ruling that none of the 2020 Dominion claims were true and quoting Newsmax’s own on-record clarification.
Germany told Moscow to halt 'illegal cyber-activities' after a rise in phishing against politicians before the September 2021 vote, saying it had reliable information attributing Ghostwriter to cyberactors of the Russian state, specifically the GRU.
Investigative reporting on the Slovak election deepfake and how it spread, arguing it fit pro-Kremlin information activity — an allegation about origin that was not accompanied by an authoritative state attribution.
Analysis of Slovakia's 30 September 2023 parliamentary election, in which SMER-SD placed first with 22.94% and Progressive Slovakia second with 17.96% on 68.51% turnout, and disinformation featured heavily in the campaign's final days.
Reports Mandiant's assessment, with high confidence, that UNC1151 — the group providing technical support to the Ghostwriter campaign — is linked to the Belarusian government, with operators likely located in Minsk and evidence of a link to the Belarusian military. Mandiant could not rule out a Russian contribution but found no direct evidence of one.
Documents the AI-generated audio impersonating journalist Monika Tódová and Progressive Slovakia leader Michal Šimečka that spread on Facebook during the pre-election moratorium, AFP's assessment that it was manipulated, and the gap in platform policy that covered manipulated video but not audio.
A structured threat-actor profile of UNC1151 summarising its assessed links to Belarus, its role providing technical support to the Ghostwriter campaign, and its operations against Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Germany.
The EU associated the 'Ghostwriter' malicious cyber activities with the Russian state, condemning the targeting of parliamentarians, officials, journalists and civil society across member states — including attempts to steal the credentials of German lawmakers ahead of the September 2021 federal election.
Indictment of six officers of GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm). The charged conduct includes April–May 2017 spear-phishing and hack-and-leak operations targeting Emmanuel Macron's La République En Marche! party, French politicians and local governments ahead of the 2017 French election — a later, formal U.S. attribution of the operation to Russian military intelligence.
Real-time digital-forensics analysis finding that #MacronLeaks was launched from the United States by alt-right accounts (the hashtag coined by Jack Posobiec), boosted by probable automated bots, and driven to roughly half a million tweets within 24 hours before reaching a French audience.
Reports the Ghostwriter spear-phishing against German lawmakers ahead of the 2021 election — the German government said the email accounts of seven Bundestag members and 31 members of regional parliaments were targeted, to steal credentials for use in disinformation.
Official proclamation of the second-round result: Emmanuel Macron 66.10% (20,743,128 votes) and Marine Le Pen 33.90% (10,638,475), on 74.56% turnout. The Council annulled 16,467 ballots across 38 of 69,242 polling stations (0.05% of votes) — routine local irregularities, with no finding that the tally was compromised.
Analysis of the 26 September 2021 Bundestag election, in which the SPD (25.7%) narrowly overtook the CDU/CSU (24.1%), ahead of the Greens (14.8%), FDP (11.5%) and AfD (10.3%) on 76.4% turnout, leading to a Scholz-led coalition.
Reporting Trend Micro research that the APT28 group (Pawn Storm / Fancy Bear) registered phishing domains impersonating Macron's En Marche campaign — such as onedrive-en-marche.fr — in March 2017 to steal campaign credentials, weeks before the leak.
A detailed reconstruction of the 2017 hack-and-leak against Emmanuel Macron's En Marche campaign — the spear-phishing, the dump of roughly nine gigabytes of emails timed just before the mandatory pre-election media blackout, the forged documents mixed in, the bot-driven amplification, and the attribution to Russian military intelligence — concluding the operation failed to change the election's outcome.
The head of France's cyber-defence agency ANSSI, Guillaume Poupard, said investigators found no APT28 fingerprints in the Macron hack, describing it as 'so generic and simple that it could have been practically anyone' and declining to attribute it to any state — a deliberately cautious public stance on attribution.
A catalogued record of the September 2023 Slovak election deepfake — an AI-generated audio purporting to capture Progressive Slovakia's Michal Šimečka and a journalist planning to rig the vote — with links to the fact-checks that assessed it as synthetic.
Zambia's first general election under the late-2025 constitutional changes combines a presidential contest with an enlarged National Assembly. The Electoral Commission has published the timetable, a final register of 8.8 million voters and a polling-station count-and-post procedure; implementation of those safeguards is the central integrity test.
Sweden's first general election since completing NATO accession, run on an all-paper ballot with manual counting — a system with few of the technical attack surfaces that dominate election-integrity debate elsewhere. That makes the information environment, rather than the count, the place where pressure would show.
Nigeria's 2027 cycle will be the first general election under the Electoral Act 2026 and the first led by INEC chair Joash Amupitan. The core integrity tests are inclusive registration and PVC collection, nationwide logistics and security, reliable BVAS accreditation, prompt publication and reconciliation of polling-unit forms, and visible implementation of lessons from 2023.
Morocco will elect the House of Representatives on 23 September. Preparations include voter-roll revision, a central monitoring commission and a special audiovisual-media regime that covers political pluralism and deceptive AI-generated election content.
Kenya will hold its fourth general election under the 2010 constitution on 10 August 2027. A reconstituted IEBC has published an operational plan after a long vacancy. Register completeness, legal reform, boundary and nomination readiness, campaign finance, technology testing, polling-form transparency, inclusion and peaceful dispute resolution are the main preparation tests.
Israel's election for the 120-seat Knesset is scheduled for 27 October. The nationwide proportional contest uses paper party-list slips and manual counting. A July State Comptroller report makes the public response to foreign digital influence a specific institutional issue rather than a generic warning.
The Gambia elects its president using the country's distinctive marble-and-drum ballot system. The Independent Electoral Commission has published a detailed calendar, while the 2021 EU observer mission provides a concrete reform baseline for the legal framework, campaign and media environment.
Fiji's campaign period is open, but the writ and polling date have not yet been issued. Voters will fill 55 seats through a single nationwide open-list proportional contest. Date communication, register closure, postal and pre-poll access, candidate-number voter education, station-level counting and the public results system are the main checkpoints.
Ecuador will elect 5,749 principal provincial, municipal, parish and citizen-participation officials on 29 November. A 13.8-million-person register, thousands of offices and candidacies, statutory gender and youth rules, CPCCS candidate vetting, overseas participation and multiple results systems make audit access and precise voter information especially important.
Cabo Verde will elect its president on 15 November, with citizens voting in the islands and diaspora. The immediate integrity checkpoints are completion of registration before the 65-day suspension, correction and freezing of the rolls, access for agents and observers, and reconciliation of polling-station records through the national tabulation.