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General Election 2023: Independent review of counting errors - Part 4: The errors and why they happened

Controller and Auditor-General of New Zealand (Office of the Auditor-General) · May 1, 2024

Part 4 sets out the mechanics of the errors: candidate-vote errors in 15 electorates at 17 voting places and party-vote errors in six electorates at eight voting places, plus one advance-voting ballot box that was merged in the results system but not physically merged, so 611 votes were never counted in the official count and the discrepancy grew to 620 on recount. It also records that instructions to extract apparent dual votes were not universally followed: 892 apparent dual votes sat on electorate reports when the official results were announced, later analysis narrowed this to 321 that could have affected candidate counts across all electorates, and in the single narrow-margin electorate of concern at most 24 votes may have been involved. The Commission advised that removing them would not have changed the outcome in any electorate, and it briefed the Chief District Court Judge and the three recount judges.

发布方Controller and Auditor-General of New Zealand (Office of the Auditor-General)
管辖区New Zealand
语言EN
检索时间August 29, 2026
原始存档待定

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