Ընտրություն
South Korea 2025 Presidential Election
June 3, 2025
Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party of Korea won the snap presidential election of 3 June 2025 with 49.42 per cent of the vote against 41.15 per cent for Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party, on a turnout of 79.4 per cent, the fourth highest at a presidential election since democratisation in 1987 and the highest since 1997. The vote was held because the Constitutional Court had removed President Yoon Suk Yeol from office on 4 April 2025 over the emergency martial law he declared on 3 December 2024. The case matters because that martial law decree was accompanied by the dispatch of about 297 military personnel to National Election Commission premises and was publicly justified by the president as a response to suspicions about the security of the commission's computer systems, so an election-fraud narrative that no court or inspection had found to have changed a result became the stated ground for an extraordinary measure and was then adjudicated by the courts.
Պաշտոնական արդյունքներ
The table shows the completed nationwide count that the National Election Commission declared at its plenary session at 6:21 a.m. on 4 June 2025. Percentages are each candidate's share of valid votes and therefore exclude blank and invalid ballots. A fifth candidate, the independent Song Jin-ho, took 0.10 per cent and is not shown.
- Lee Jae-myung - Democratic Party of Korea49,4%17 287 513
Elected; took office at 6:21 a.m. on 4 June 2025 without a transition period
- Kim Moon-soo - People Power Party41,2%14 395 639
- Lee Jun-seok - Reform Party8,3%2 917 523
- Kwon Young-guk - Democratic Labor Party1%344 150
Ամբողջականության մատյան
Ինչն է հաստատվում ապացույցներով, և ինչը՝ ոչ — կողք կողքի, յուրաքանչյուր արդյունք՝ աղբյուրավորված և դասակարգված։
Ինչն է հաստատված
- Ընթացակարգային խախտումներՀաստատված
Military personnel were sent to National Election Commission premises during the December 2024 martial law declaration and photographed the commission's computer systems without a warrant.
Ավելի մանրամասն
About 297 personnel were deployed within ten minutes of the declaration on the night of 3 December 2024: roughly 10 to the NEC headquarters in Gwacheon, 130 to the NEC training centre in Suwon and 47 to the National Election Survey Deliberation Commission in Seoul. The Constitutional Court found that the deployed troops controlled access, seized staff mobile phones and photographed the IT systems, and that these searches and seizures without a warrant violated the warrant requirement and infringed the independence of the commission as a constitutional body.
- Տեղեկատվական գործողություններՀաստատված
The sitting president publicly grounded the martial law decree in election-fraud suspicions about the election commission's computer systems.
Ավելի մանրամասն
In a televised address on 12 December 2024 Yoon Suk Yeol said that 'the NEC's capability of managing elections is questionable' and that he 'was wondering if voters would trust the election results when its cybersecurity is so vulnerable to cyberattacks and hacking', citing the National Intelligence Service's 2023 checkup as his basis for sending troops to commission premises. The Constitutional Court recorded his contention that martial law was declared to dispel suspicions of electoral fraud and held that simply having such suspicions did not mean that a serious crisis had actually occurred, noting that the commission had already taken security measures before the election.
- Ընթացակարգային խախտումներՀաստատված
The Constitutional Court rejected election-fraud suspicion as a lawful ground for the martial law decree, and a criminal court later held that a perceived national crisis did not justify unconstitutional means.
Ավելի մանրամասն
The Constitutional Court unanimously removed Yoon Suk Yeol from office on 4 April 2025, holding that the constitutional and statutory conditions for emergency martial law were not met and that simply having suspicions of electoral fraud did not mean a serious crisis had occurred. On 19 February 2026 the Seoul Central District Court convicted him of leading an insurrection and sentenced him to life imprisonment, holding that his justification 'confuses motive with purpose' and that 'a desire to address a perceived national crisis may explain intent, but does not justify unconstitutional means'. That criminal judgment was delivered at first instance and is not final.
- Օտարերկրյա միջամտությունՀաստատված
North Korean actors compromised a National Election Commission computer in 2021, and a 2023 state security inspection found real weaknesses in the commission's systems.
Ավելի մանրամասն
The National Intelligence Service reported that in April 2021 the North Korean group Kimsuky used malicious code against an NEC computer and stole classified documents. Its joint inspection with the Korea Internet and Security Agency between July and September 2023 found weaknesses in the voter register management, ballot counting and early voting systems and said North Korea could breach the network at any time. The commission accepted that one programme had a password management deficiency and said most identified vulnerabilities were remedied and re-inspected with NIS participation before the April 2024 National Assembly election.
Ինչն է հաստատված չէ
- Արդյունքների կեղծումՀերքված
The claim that early voting and ballot counting were computer-manipulated was tested in the Supreme Court over the 2020 National Assembly election and rejected.
Ավելի մանրամասն
The Supreme Court, the only court competent to hear a challenge to a presidential or National Assembly election, gave judgment on 28 July 2022 in cases 2020Su30 and 2020Su5028, the lead suits seeking annulment of results of the 15 April 2020 National Assembly election, and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims; the press release records the cases as those in which recount allegations were examined. Fact-checking of the whole set of suits found that all 126 were dismissed and that the irregularly printed 'cabbage leaf' ballots offered as evidence were held by the court to be minor mistakes and simple mechanical errors that could not be evidence of fraud changing an outcome.
- Օտարերկրյա միջամտությունՀերքված
Reports that Chinese nationals were caught hacking Korean election systems were called entirely false by the United States military named in them.
Ավելի մանրամասն
Claims circulating after the martial law declaration held that United States and Korean forces had arrested Chinese hackers at a National Election Commission training facility. United States Forces Korea issued a statement saying that the descriptions of and claims about the United States military in those reports were 'entirely false'. The record of the training centre for that night accounts for the people staying there as 96 in total, 88 public officials on promotion and posting courses and eight external auditors.
Աղբյուրներ՝1 - Վիճակագրական անոմալիաներՀերքված
The consistent gap between early-voting and election-day party shares is not evidence of manipulation.
Ավելի մանրամասն
The central quantitative claim of the fraud narrative is that early voters and election-day voters split too regularly between the parties to be genuine. Fact-checkers, citing a former statistics official, point out that early and election-day voters are different populations rather than random samples of a single population, because participation rates in early voting differed by candidate preference, so their shares are not expected to match. Arguments of this kind were among the grounds raised in the nullification suits over the 2020 National Assembly election, and the Supreme Court dismissed those claims.
- Օտարերկրյա միջամտությունՎիճարկված
What the 2023 security findings actually meant for election outcomes is disputed, and no body has found that a result was altered.
Ավելի մանրամասն
The National Intelligence Service said simulated attacks could manipulate voter registrations and ballot counts, mark early voters as not having participated, and print ballots without authorisation. The National Election Commission replied that even if hacking the system is technically possible that does not necessarily lead to a rigged election, because manipulating an outcome would be almost impossible without organised assistance from insiders, and it added in December 2024 that the tests had been run with its security systems partially disabled and that most identified vulnerabilities had been remedied and re-inspected with NIS participation before the April 2024 National Assembly election. No official body, court or inspection has found that any Korean election result was changed.
Գործընթացի գնահատում
The election itself was administered by the National Election Commission under the ordinary procedure for a vacancy, with counting completed at 5:02 a.m. on 4 June 2025 and the result declared by the commission in plenary session at 6:21 a.m., after which the winner took office immediately. Counting used ballot sorting machines followed by a manual verification step that had been added from the 2024 elections in response to public fraud claims, with observers appointed by the parties and candidates present, and the commission said most of the vulnerabilities identified in the 2023 security inspection had been remedied and re-inspected before the April 2024 National Assembly election. No court has invalidated a Korean national election result on fraud grounds; the Supreme Court, the only body competent to hear such a challenge, has dismissed the suits brought to it.